

Econ 809 Problem Set 1

1. Assume a partial order on integers, where $a \leq b$ if a is a factor of b . What do we call the meet and join of two numbers?

Answer: Greatest common divisor and least common multiple

2. Assume a partial order of set inclusion on the set of all subsets of a finite set. Assume each element is a college you might apply to, $k=1,2,\dots,N$. Assume the function $f(S)$ is the probability of gaining admission to some college s into the set $S \subset N$.

(a) What is the smallest sublattice that contains any three given schools i,j,k ?

(b) Assume admission to college k has chance p_k , and admission events are independent. Is f supermodular, submodular or neither? Prove your claim succinctly!

Answer to (a): all subsets, ordered by set inclusion

Answer to (b): I confess my only argument here is to check for diminishing returns

$$(**) v(S + j) - v(S) \geq v(T + j) - v(T) \text{ if } S \subset T$$

and use Proposition 5.1 in Lovász (1982), noted in class and the paper. To see why (**) is true, notice that if T has higher ranked schools than j than S then one would take those schools over j . But conversely, S can NOT have any higher ranked schools than j than T does, since $S \subset T$.

3. Prove that the 0-1 indicator function I of

(a) intervals $(-\infty, a]$ or $[a, \infty)$ are log-supermodular on the reals

(b) rectangles $[0, a] \times [0, b]$ are log-supermodular in the northeast partial order in $[0, 1]^2$

Solution of (a): This follows by considering cases for indicator of $I(x, a)$ of either $x \leq a$ or $x \geq a$ for values $a' < a''$. For the only way log-supermodularity fails is if $I(x, a') = I(x, a'') = 1$ and $I(x, \min(a', a'')) = 0$ or $I(x, \max(a', a'')) = 0$, which is impossible for either of those indicator functions.

Part (b) also proceeds by showing that the contrary inequality is impossible. Yuxin Jin's solution:

cb). The northeast partial order is defined by:

$$(x_1, x_2) \leq (y_1, y_2) \Leftrightarrow x_1 \leq y_1, x_2 \leq y_2$$

Given a rectangle $R = [0, a] \times [0, b] \subset [0, 1]^2$, we check whether the indicator function satisfies:

$$I_R(x \vee y) \cdot I_R(x \wedge y) \geq I_R(x) \cdot I_R(y)$$

If $x, y \in R$, then both $\max(x_i, y_i) \leq a$ and $\min(x_i, y_i) \leq b$, so $x \vee y \in R$.

Similarly, $\min(x_i, y_i) \leq a$ and $\max(x_i, y_i) \leq b$, so $x \wedge y \in R$. Hence the inequality holds.

Therefore, the indicator function of a rectangle is log-supermodular in the northeast partial order.

4. Prove that $|x-y|^\gamma$ is submodular if $\gamma \geq 1$.

Solution: It is a theorem in this literature that if $g(x)=x^\gamma$ is convex, then $f(x,y)=g(x-y)$ is SBM – eg if differentiable, it follows by taking the cross partial derivative. Hereby I thank Yuxin Jin.

5. Suppose every player $i=1,2,\dots,n+1$ picks a random time t according to a cdf $F(t)$ over $[0, \infty)$. Assume n players independently make their time choice. If your time is the k th highest you get payoff x_k , where $x_k - x_{k-1}$ changes sign $m < n$ times. Show that every player's expected payoff changes sign at most m times in t .

Solution: This was critical in my 2008 paper “[Caller Number Five and related timing games](#)”.

Sadly, I see that I need to assume a continuous cdf. I will screenshot the solution:

Consider a symmetric continuous strategy G . If $G(t) = g$,⁹ then the expected payoff of a player who stops at time t , when all others stop according to G , is

$$\phi(g) := \sum_{k=0}^N \binom{N}{k} g^k (1-g)^{N-k} v(k+1).$$

Then in the appendix:

LEMMA 4 (Variation diminishing property of expected rank rewards). *The slope-sign variations are ranked $SV(\Delta v) \geq SV(\phi')$, and $SV(\Delta v) - SV(\phi')$ is an even number. Further, the signs of the first and last slopes of v and ϕ coincide.*

PROOF. The derivative of $\phi(g)$ in g can be expressed as follows:

$$\phi'(g) = \sum_{k=1}^N \binom{N}{k} k g^{k-1} (1-g)^{N-k} (v(k+1) - v(k)).$$

Assume that $SV(\Delta v) = m$, i.e. the first difference $\Delta v(k)$ changes its sign m times. Scale ϕ' by $g/(1-g)^N$, and let $a_k := k \binom{N}{k} (v(k+1) - v(k))$ and $z := g/(1-g)$. Then

$$\frac{g}{(1-g)^N} \phi'(g) = \sum_{k=1}^N k \binom{N}{k} (v(k+1) - v(k)) \left(\frac{g}{1-g} \right)^k = \sum_{k=1}^N a_k z^k =: P(z).$$

Obviously, $P(z(g))$ and $\phi'(g)$ enjoy the same number of sign variations, i.e. positive real roots of P . By Descartes' Rule of Signs, this number is at most the number of sign changes of its coefficients a_0, a_1, \dots, a_N . Also, if smaller, it is smaller by a multiple of 2. Thus $SV(\Delta v) \geq SV(\phi')$ and $SV(\Delta v) - SV(\phi')$ is even.

Finally, $\phi'(0) = \Delta v(1)$ and $\phi'(1) = \Delta v(N)$, proving the last clause. \square