Constrained Efficient Informational Herding: An Introduction to Optimal Experimentation

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Social Learning — Case 2: The Altruistic Professor

- Altruistic Professor's payoff is the expected Student's payoff.
- \blacktriangleright When $\pi \leq 1/3,$ the selfish Professor always chooses paper ℓ
- ▶ Paper ℓ integrates over private signals $\sigma < \hat{\sigma}$, and h over $\sigma > \hat{\sigma}$
- Seeing Professor's actions, Student updates to posterior beliefs

$$\hat{p}_{\ell}(\pi,\hat{\sigma}) = \frac{\pi\hat{\sigma}^2}{\pi\hat{\sigma}^2 + (1-\pi)\hat{\sigma}} < \pi < \hat{p}_{h}(\pi,\hat{\sigma}) = \frac{\pi[1-\hat{\sigma}^2]}{\pi[1-\hat{\sigma}^2] + (1-\pi)[1-\hat{\sigma}]}$$

- Proof: Use Bayes rule, given 𝑘(σ) = 2σ & 𝑘(σ) = 1.
 See Smith, Sorensen, Tian, (2020) = SST
- Since $E[P|\pi, \hat{\sigma}] = \pi$, by the law of iterated expectations: $E[V(P)|\pi, \hat{\sigma}] = E[(5P-4+1/P)/2|\pi, \hat{\sigma}] = \frac{5}{2}\pi - 2 + \frac{1}{2}E[(1/P)|\pi, \hat{\sigma}]$
- Maximize this over $\hat{\sigma}$
 - Algebra is in Smith, Sorensen and Tian (2021), "Informational Herding, Optimal Experimentation, and Contrarianism"

The Altruistic Professor's Contrarian Behavior

- Selfish Professor's posterior odds threshold was 1
- As confidence in state H rises (π ↑), Altruistic Professor leans more against paper h, i.e. posterior odds threshold increases
- ► Our altruistic threshold signal ⇒ posterior odds threshold:

$$\frac{f^{\mathcal{H}}(\hat{\sigma}(\pi))}{f^{\mathcal{L}}(\hat{\sigma}(\pi))}\frac{\pi}{1-\pi} = 2\hat{\sigma}(\pi)\frac{\pi}{1-\pi} = \frac{\sqrt{\pi^2 + 2\pi(1-\pi)} - \pi}{1-\pi}.$$



The Altruistic Professor's Optimal Value

The altruistic Professor's value function is the myopic payoff U(π) on [0, 1/5] inside the cascade, and on [1/5, 1] is:

$$E[V(P)|\pi, \hat{\sigma}(\pi)] = V(\pi) + \frac{1-\pi}{\pi} \cdot \frac{\pi(3-2\pi) - \sqrt{1-(1-\pi)^2}}{\pi + \sqrt{1-(1-\pi)^2}}.$$

• Altruism shrinks Professor's cascade beliefs: $[0, \frac{1}{3}] \rightarrow [0, \frac{1}{5}]$.





Least signal LR f^H(0)/f⁴(0) = 0 ⇒ No cascade on paper h
 Max signal LR f^H(1)/f⁴(1) = 2 < ∞ ⇒ ∃ cascade on paper l