Lones Smith

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Repeated Games

Dynamic Deception, Anderson and Smith (AER, 2014)

Repeated Games with Present-biased Preferences, Chade, Prokopovych, and Smith (JET, 2008)

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
, Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (Econometrica, 1994)

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem (Econometrica, 1995)

Folk theorems in overlapping generations games (Games and Economic Behavior, 1992)

Working papers:

“Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring”, Josh Cherry and Lones Smith (mimeo)

“Strategically Valuable Information”, Josh Cherry and Lones Smith (mimeo, 2014)

 

 

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