Information, Learning, and Experimentation

Social Learning

Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning, Smith and Sorensen (Econometrica, 2000)

Rational Social Learning with Random SamplingSmith and Sorensen

Informational Herding, Optimal Experimentation, and Contrarianism, Smith,  Sorensen, and Tian (under revision for Review of Economic Studies)

Observational Learning, Smith and Sorensen, New Palgrave (2011)


P
olitical Economy

Optimal Electoral Timing: Exercise Wisely and You May Live Longer, Keppo, Smith, and Davydov (RES, 2008)

Finance Theory

Private Information and Trade Timing (AER, 2000)

Static and Dynamic Information Value and Information Demand 

The Demand for Information: More Heat Than Light  Keppo, Moscarini and Smith (JET, 2008)

The Law of Large Demand for Information, Moscarini and Smith (Econometrica, 2002)

The Optimal Level of Experimentation, Moscarini and Smith (Econometrica, 2001)